Legal Settlement as Reentrancy Attack: Auditing Huawei's US Trial and the Geopolitics of Trust

The indictment against Huawei is not a legal document. It is an assert() call. Somewhere in the sovereign smart contract of US export control, a condition evaluated to false, and the entire branch reverted. Code doesn't lie; audits do. But we haven't been audited yet. We have been indicted. For anyone who spent 2020 staring at Groth16 constraint gates for a privacy protocol, the pattern is familiar. A system designed to validate external state keeps finding hash collisions in its own diplomatic logic. We are not looking at a legal battle. We are looking at a forced fork in the global telecom mainnet. Since the DAO, I keep warning that trust is a bug. Now, the United States government is blaming Huawei for invoking that bug on a sanctioned network. And they are going to trial to prove it. Let's run the debugging trace. This is the log data: Huawei heads to trial in the US over alleged business dealings in Iran. The charges stem from accusations of sanctions violations related to the US's long-standing embargo on Iranian entities. The source report analyzing this event is refreshingly incomplete on military hardware. It lists equipment tech level, deployment, nuclear deterrence, and logistics as information insufficient. That is the right answer. A telecom vendor is not an army corps. The report correctly concluded that its military capabilities are not subordinate to this event. But like all protocol-level disclosures, the hidden logic masks the actual payload—what is classified as a 'military risk' in this trial is the dual-use nature of 5G network infrastructure. The report notes that if Huawei's Iranian business involves telecom infrastructure, potential military communication or intelligence leaks exist. That's pure conjecture. But high-confidence economic and geopolitical signaling cannot be ignored. The trial escalates US-China tech competition to the judicial layer, weaponizing legal code to force trust delamination. The core conclusion of my analysis is straightforward: this is a settlement attack. Not in a courtroom drama sense, but in the pure protocol sense—an externally owned account executing a script against a contract holding massive value in foreign markets. Whether the court finds Huawei guilty is secondary. The settlement phase is the panic it causes to the global supply chain. I wrote a 40-page internal report in 2017 analyzing 12,000 lines of EVM assembly code. I wanted to find the root cause of the DAO vulnerability beyond the high-level Solidity line. I traced the reentrancy to a memory management contradiction in the call opcode. The program counter returned, but the balance updates didn't. See, high-level code always assumes atomicity. The law assumes sovereignty. The Huawei trial addresses the same bug at the geoeconomic layer. US sanctions assume Chinese telecom firms will not execute certain financial or commercial state transitions when queried by Iranian entities. But under the hood, consortiums exist, subsidiaries push transactions, and messaging channels bridge the gas. The wall around Iran has holes because the enforcement code is only as strong as its third-party interdependency. This trial is a fix for that. But instead of patching the contract, the US is forking the chain. It wants to slash the trust link between Western economies and Huawei so severely that no cross-chain message ever gets verified again. From a protocol mechanics standpoint, this trial gives us the 'State Transfer Report.' It lays out exactly what a withdrawal looks like when the operator is a hostile foreign contractor. Let's focus on the global settlement layers. The indictment revolves around Iran. For the uninitiated, Iran is a core region under an enormous blanket of US extraterritorial sanctions. The source report flags this as the highest-confidence indicator. And I agree. 'This event is a precise extension of the US sanctions system in the tech field, directly targeting Huawei's commercial activities in Iran.' That is a textbook application of long-arm jurisdiction. Long-arm jurisdiction is nothing more than a function call that reaches into another domain's memory. If you send a message to a contract you don't control, it will execute its own code. Here, the US is sending a message to the entire Chinese tech ecosystem. The trial asserts that Huawei communicated with a blacklisted oracle, got a false negative, and misrepresented its compliance. But this isn't code interacting with a testnet oracle. This is the US claiming they have a Merkle proof of culpability. Multiple expert analyses fail to find direct evidence of that proof. The hidden information is the sanctions evasion itself. How did money move to Iran without the global banking layer detecting it? Mainstream financial media will call this sanctions evasion. I call it an unpublished smart contract. Let's break the constraints down. The US Treasury OFAC maintains a Specially Designated Nationals list—the SDN list. This is a registry of addresses banned from interacting with US persons and businesses. Compliance departments across the world run transaction monitoring systems against this registry. They do this because their own banks interface with the dollar clearing network. The network is a giant ReentrancyGuard. If a transaction hits an Iranian entity, total revert of the lifeboat. This infrastructure is robust for the standard case. But industry reports on Huawei show they subsequently restructured into a massive network of shell companies to keep serving Iranian clients. They used the equivalent of flash loans through non-sanctioned jurisdictions. The core evidence presented at trial likely compiles a thousand small interactions. Each was technically valid, but associated, allowing the final state to be invalid. If you leave traces, there is no privacy. The report concludes the risk of China-US tech decoupling is high. I would go further. Decoupling is not a risk; it is an activated feature. The moment the US DOJ uses a legal hammer to enforce territorial finality, they have broken the canonical chain they themselves built. You cannot have a global free-trade economy and also single-handedly quarantine a node. It creates an inconsistency that only a juridical fork can resolve. During my time verifying ZK-SNARK circuits for the PrivateCoin protocol in 2020, we had to audit 500,000 constraints. We found a mismatch in the public input encoding that could have allowed a malicious prover to push false public statements. The bug didn't break the math; it broke the interface definition. State channels connect at the edges. The sender said X. The circuit proved Y. The verifier saw Z. There is an analogous defect at the heart of the US legal case against Huawei. US law requires you not to do business with Iran. But globally, telecommunication equipment has no nationality. A 5G base station operating outside Iranian borders can route packets to Iranian endpoints without violating any local law. Only US law claims to have the jurisdiction over those packets. That's the equivalent of a smart contract writing to another contract's storage without permission. Ethereum patched that through the concept of storage isolation. The US tries to patch it with court dates. This trial is the failure of interface compatibility between two massive decentralized networks—the global telecom supply chain and the US-sanctioned international finance system. A big takeaway from my L2 dispute game audit in 2022 was that we didn't have enough bonding requirements to prevent censorship attacks. I published a paper on gas costs vs. security in dispute games. In an optimistic rollup, you assume a state is valid until a challenger calls out fraud. Only a bond is at stake. The Huawei trial is a fraudulent state claim on a global scale. Chinese telecom companies continuously propose new states of global communication infrastructure. The US is playing the challenger. It posts the bond of its reputation. It submits a fraud proof—the indictment documents an Iranian business deal—and it challenges the integrity of the whole operation. But here is the unusual point: the optimistic rollup has a 30-day challenge window. Imagine the entire 5G roll-out spent in legal contention. It puts the infrastructure adoption in a state of false uncertainty. The source material flags this as a 5G infrastructure trust crisis, saying, 'Huawei products being widely questioned may directly impact infrastructure construction.' This is code for a prolonged Withdrawal Challenge. What saves Ethereum-based rollups is the impartiality of execution. The challenge is verified by a force on the L1. In the geopolitical setting, who enforces the L1? SWIFT is not neutral. The ITU is not neutral. The Chinese government will simply assert the opposite—that the US's legal case is invalid under international trade law. Both canonical histories exist. The law will not resolve this. The market will. For this sector, risk manifests as slow liquidity exit. Companies exposed to Huawei networks will start unwinding positions. The report identifies this concretely as a global supply chain trust crisis. I want to stress what a supply chain is in network terms. It is a dependency graph. If the provider node is malicious—or merely accused of being malicious—every downstream component must verify every other. The cost of verification explodes. Defense budgets cannot absorb these audit costs. We are watching the transaction fees of global trade quadruple due to a single fraudulent state proof. Let's analyze the specific attack vectors that this indictment exposes. The source report breaks down the military concerns and finds insufficient data. Actually, that in itself is an indicator. There is no public audit trail showing Huawei's direct military applications in Iran. So why mention it? Because the US desires to shift Huawei from a 'neutral infrastructure provider' to a 'state security risk.' In cryptographic terms, they are attempting to poison the reputation oracle. Once the oracle price for Huawei drops, every contract that relied on its price-for-trust becomes insolvent. The trick works: Europe shifts to Ericsson or Nokia, Japan shifts to Fujitsu. The trust graph is pruned. But the blind spot in the source report is the absence of 'economic security integration.' The massive final impact is not the trial's outcome, but the cost of diversion. During the 2022 bear market, I designed MPC schemes for institutional custody. To store $50 million in assets, we needed a 5-of-9 threshold key scheme. The intention was to distribute trust so that you can pass regulatory scrutiny while still keeping funds secure. What does a company do when their own security depends on a Chinese-owned hardware root of trust? They cannot fork the hardware. The Huawei case causes firms to preemptively conform to US sanction regimes. Even firms that have legally no business with Iran will start auditing their software stack for any Huawei kernel modules. This repatriates capital to US network effects. The trial costs Huawei billions in lost deals, regardless of the verdict. That is the economic security integration. The lawyer running the case knows that the legal outcome is less valuable than causing computation delays in the approval processes for new infrastructure. Procurement boards are part of a pBFT consensus. When one Byzantine node is accused, no new blocks complete. In my Solidity audit sessions, I show students a pattern: if you have an external contract with a malicious implementation, a single unprotected delegatecall can change your storage into the attacker's database. In our sovereign state architectural context, this is what the Iranian business unit did. They delegatecalled into a subsidiary. They changed the storage of the parent. The court says that even opening a communication channel to Iran is a delegatecall into a banned context. And if that context executes, you lose control of the parent company's claim to US markets. The solution in Solidity is straightforward: never use delegatecall with untrusted addresses. Huawei failed to make that separation. They trusted that the subsidiary would behave. Trust is a bug, not a feature. The code of the company violated this. But here's the thing: the banking networks do the same thing. JPMorgan tracks transactions with Iran through carefully structured correspondent accounts. The only difference is that they maintain official legal channels to make it compliant. In crypto, we call that 'permissionless interop.' Let's zoom into the geoeconomic duel implicit in the source report. They assign a 'high confidence' grade to the notion that this trial highlights 'US sanctions enforcement' and 'tech decoupling.' It's worth emphasizing that this trial gives the world a specific moment when code meets state violence. In my earlier writings, I often quoted: The DAO was a warning that we ignored. The DAO was a smart contract with a massive liquidity pool, a recursive call flaw, and a community that believed in code. An attacker drained 3.6 million ETH because the project could not handle a reentrant unauthorized state change. Huaweis' trial on Iran is a government-level reentrant attack on its global dominance. The US didn't reenter the Huawei smart contract to steal its money. They reentered its compliance procedure to steal its ability to operate. This should be the most taught legal case in blockchain law courses. It shows that the third-party execution layer is the weakest link. The historical context of the Ethereum DAO is important here: the eventual solution was to fork the chain. The Ethereum community chose to erase the attacker's balance and restore the DAO victim's funds. Is the world going to fork Huawei? Can we simply use the state to erase the Chinese government's ownership of Huawei? No. Because the state is not neutral in international politics. The global IT infrastructure cannot hard fork without severe systemic outage. There is an implicit assumption among crypto enthusiasts that decentralization of money prevents this reentrant geopolitical attack. But herein lies the source report's own finding: if Huawei is merely a node in the global network, it's replaceable. They wrote that non-US companies could benefit from supply-chain restructuring. That's true. But for those of us who audit actual systems, we know that decentralization is a spectrum. The US legal action against Huawei now encourages other nations to spin up their own telecommunication protocols. This is precisely an interoperability failure that cannot be solved by a court settlement. The enforcement of US law over Huawei is done through intermediaries—chipsets, software licenses, international banking. To bypass it, Huawei has begun to vertically integrate. It creates its own peripherals. It avoids using US software APIs. This alternative chain is functional but slower. It is exactly what a Layer 2 protocol looks like when the base chain is hostile. They have opened an optimistic rollup, assuming that all transactions internally are valid, and they will periodically send a fraud-proof upward to Chinese regulators to reconcile. Recall the deep technical breakdown I performed in L2 Fraud Proof mechanisms. The 30-day challenge window exists to ensure every honest verifier can catch a malicious block producer. The Huawei trial creates a human-level challenge window. The question is: who can dispute the claim that Huawei violated sanctions? The United States can issue a subpoena. But what if Iran says the business dealings are legal? Iran's vote is not counted. What if China says US sanctions do not have extraterritorial effect under the UN Charter? China's vote is discounted. Thus, the challenge window isn't permissionless. It is restricted only to the dominant economic validators. That is unacceptable in a neutral dispute-resolution system. We don't let a supermajority of miners alter history if an invalid transaction is mined. Yet, this legal dispute framework allows the controlling government to fork the truth. For everyone else, the only option is to follow the fork with the majority economic weight. Let's go deeper into how we can actually stress-test this geopolitical event using blockchain concepts. Consider the reported statement that the trial could 'significantly impact global tech supply chains.' I propose we quantify this impact. Let's treat Huawei as a validator. It has an enormous stake in the global 5G network. It proposes new network states—infrastructure deployments. The U.S. Criminal Division acts as the challenger. They say the proposed block contains an invalid transaction related to Iran. To continue the consensus, Huawei must produce a proof that its Iranian transactions were not done under U.S. jurisdiction. But in the US code, jurisdiction is defined by the simple act of transacting with US content. Since the actual specificities of the chip design or patent licenses are embedded, almost all Huawei equipment interacts with US intellectual property. Therefore, the proof is impossible to generate. This is the "knowledge" problem: you cannot prove a negative. The U.S. government is asking Huawei to provide a zero-knowledge proof that there is no US-sanctioned technology inside their Iranian infrastructure. But you cannot generate a ZK proof that you did not commit a crime. And you cannot produce a valid proof to convince a hostile verifier. That's the fundamental flaw in using a court to discipline a transnational corporation. They ask for a guarantee of innocence in a system where legal exposure is indefinite. But what if the US is not trying to find the truth? The source report's darkest inference supports this theory. It states the trial itself is a signal for global information warfare. 'The trial itself is a cognitive warfare signal... to transmit the strategy of tech containment.' This matches the empirical evidence. The US does not need a verdict to be effective. It only needs Huawei to suffer the legal overhead. All globally oriented companies will now avoid Huawei products just to minimize their own legal exposure. Huawei will suffer massive market share losses purely due to risk aversion, not on a proven claim of wrongdoing. The Contrarian angle: Most pro-crypto analysts would say, 'Decentralization will save us from these centralized geopolitical attacks.' But that is naïve. This trial shows the strength of territorial legal attack against an attempted global deployment. The blockchain ecosystem is also facing this attack. What happens when the US sends an indictment to the developers of a decentralized sequencer because their relay operator routed an American trader's transaction to an entity in Cuba? The US can pursue legal claims against nodes. Territorial jurisdictions are the ultimate centralized validators. If a US judge says the operator is liable, all US node operators must comply. The theoretical censorship resistance of blockchain faces its most severe test at the jurisdictional layer, exactly like Huawei. Looking at the evolution of US economic statecraft, the trial is the resolution trigger of what I've been analyzing for over a decade. There are no separate data centers for 'freedom.' Any large-scale infrastructure—physical or digital—needs maintenance, has suppliers, and requires currency to settle bills. The US legal system is the settlement layer for most of these transactions. Therefore, nobody can launch a pure 'neutral' network. The secret is to make the network robust by having no single point of failure. In that way, the US might win against Huawei, but it will only lose their authority when a parallel network is willing to carry its own data to Iran, regardless of a US court. But what about the military-diplomatic effect? The source report tries to invalidate the military discussion by saying 'informational insufficiency' but then transitions to China-U.S. confrontation. Realpolitik is the only code that runs deterministically. The key point hidden in the report is that Huawei is facing a trial, not a sanctions listing. A sanctions listing is the product of an automated process through the OFAC. A trial is a discretionary, expensive, adversarial process. A motivated OFAC listing can be sidestepped. A criminal indictment is the release of an exploit. The expected outcome is to freeze the company's expansion—not just in the US, but globally. The question is whether China can retreat and build their own set of non-sanctionable infrastructure. They can. China has the capital and the market. They have fostered native equivalents of chips, operating systems, and satellites. The more the US attacks, the more it accelerates a hard fork. From my Institutional Custody consulting engagements, I've learned that regulations are merely setting 'topological invariants.' The U.S. enforces invariants on the companies that touch dollar liquidity. A company cannot hold a sanctioned asset unless they are ready to lose the invariant of dollar access. The same applies to Huawei. They touched an invariant that disallows transactions with an Iranian blacklist. This is exactly how the Ethereum Virtual Machine works—the state will revert if you try to transfer value to an address that doesn't support it. However, in EVM, the code is deterministic. The judge here is not deterministic. The trial becomes a debate over whether Iran actually received a transfer. Professional cyber-security reports provide a massive insight that the mainstream analysis often misses: The real defense against such a legal attack is robust audit trails. When an auditor does code review, they want to see the event logs for every transaction. If the logs show that only non-sanctioned entities touched the system, you are safe. If the logs are missing, you're cooked. The US DOJ can assert that because Huawei's business recordkeeping is not fully transparent, they cannot rule out the Iranian behavior. This puts the burden of proof onto the company. For institutions holding crypto, the same applies. You need complete, transparent records. One underappreciated detail in the source report is 'economic coercion.' The report says, 'The trial constitutes economic/legal coercion... The sanction effectiveness of the United States in the Middle East may be weakened.' That may be true. But there's a more immediate vulnerability: if Huawei starts collapsing under the legal pressure, it will be bought out by state-run Chinese entities. Thus, the US gained no commercial advantage; it just accelerated the transfer of key technology into direct state ownership. In blockchain terms, the US initiated an attack on an external smart contract. The external smart contract did not change its code. The US internal storage was altered: it lost market influence. The finality of the forking can take years to surface. Let's not forget the unspoken part of the indictment. The entire business in question is allegedly conducted under the shadow of a global financial messaging network, SWIFT. The U.S. has no unilateral 'kill switch' on global trade. But it does have something similar to a multi-sig key with the SWIFT infrastructure. This key must be controlled by the private keys held in New York and Brussels. If a Chinese bank wants to send a payment to Huawei, and the underlying revenue originates from Iran, the transaction will be flagged at corresponding banks. The U.S. does not need to understand the fine-grained logic. It simply threatens the global banking system: 'if you clear transactions for Huawei, you become a sanctioned entity.' This is algorithmic blacklisting. Proponents of decentralized finance cite this as their raison d'etre. If banks can become judges, they can block flows. Entering the space, I saw over and over: 'Decentralization is the answer.' But I have audited 500,000 constraint gates. I know that during execution, the majority of the code is hidden in a black box of trusted setup. If any part of the setup is malicious, the whole circuit is corrupted. In the geopolitical game, trusted setups are rare. The US and China are two superpowers with conflicting cryptographic honesty. Neither can call a fair trusted setup. What signals do we need to track? The report provided a neat list. We should monitor the trial date and outcome. If Huawei's response is denial, that's an indication they will fight. If Huawei withdraws from several international contracts, that means they fear further discoveries. The strongest signal is if Chinese-backed alternatives emerge and increase their market share. If Europe allows Chinese state-owned companies to operate 5G infrastructure despite US objections, we've seen another step in the disintermediation of US supremacy. We should measure global 5G infrastructure as a distributed network. If a hunk of networking gear from Huawei is unusable in the US, it is not due to lack of cryptographic strength of their base stations. It is because they are not Trusted Execution Environments to the US. The introduction of this trial means the notion of 'Trust but Verify' is dead. We need 'Zero Knowledge, Maximum Proof.' Without bringing the tech into the core of the geopolitical play, any future proof is worthless. I’ll give you an interesting analogy from my MPC audit. When a validator has five keys, it can lose one and rebuild. The best security model is the 5-of-9 threshold. Huawei had network access to various markets, including Iran. If they had localized the network into a 5-of-9 threshold, such that US jurisdiction was only one of the keys, they would have succeeded. Instead, they remained highly centralized, depending on American legal approval for tech components. Thus, the US controlled a single key that could re-sign the entire network. A smart multinational should harden itself by decentralizing into sovereign markets. But Huawei didn't split into 5 separate entities. Therefore, the settlement attack had maximum impact. In the future, this precedent will create massive headaches for all global technology providers. As a technical auditor, my advice is: avoid hardcoded centralization. Construct a network where there is no single point of legal failure. The source article gives the idea that this results in a "Global 5G/Telecom reset." That reset means building technical defenses to avoid US jurisdiction. This will force a fork. The long-term outcome for global financial technology depends on the speed at which the world can produce new settlement layers. Let me conclude the highly technical part. The narrative of the trial is weak. The US is not seeking to protect Iran sanctions; they are seeking to protect their monopoly over legal narrative. They make this clear in several points across the reporting: Huawei may seek third-party support. And if they do, they will galvanize other foreign tech giants to question US legal supremacy. However, I predict that is exactly the path we are on. The US can win all the battles in court yet lose the global infrastructure war. As sanctions lose their immediacy, the market will open to any competitor that can offer a clear, low-friction proof of compliance. Based on my experience decomposing the DAO, the first thing an auditor does is figure out which smart contract operation is draining users. Here, the drain is not on user funds but on the trust of international law. If you cannot rely on US legal guarantees for your infrastructure, you cannot rely on US banks for processing. If you cannot rely on US banks, you build alternative rails. The vast majority of global GDP resides on these private rails. This trial is one of the most powerful tailwinds for Bitcoin we have seen in a decade. It validates the narrative that separation of money and state is not a cosmetic change, but a security critical patch against long-arm jurisdiction. When sovereign legal systems exploit arbitrary assembly code to cause a global settlement fragmentation, that's a robust argument for an apolitical asset. The only failure in Bitcoin is that it depends on state-run power grids, and if the power grid is controlled by Huawei, we might have issues with proof-of-work attribution. But that's another caveat. Final verdict: The court date is just another function call. The US sends a message, and Huawei's execution environment decides to handle it gracefully or revert. The historical data shows the irreversible path forward to tech decoupling. The source report produced a multidimensional radar map with scores: Geopolitical 7, Economic Security 8, Economic Impact 7. My mathematical mapping yields the same. But main chain US will always face resistance from external nodes. Zero knowledge, maximum proof. In this kind of adversarial environment, you cannot plead ignorance. You can only prove compliance by anonymous means. There is a solution: eventually, sanctions compliance will shift from sending sensitive business records to global regulators toward providing zero-knowledge proofs of non-interaction. If Huawei can demonstrate with a zk-SNARK that its business never bridged with the Iranian counterparty—while omitting sensitive commercial details—then legal discovery would be moot. That requires a settlement layer that accepts proofs of inactivity. The current NSA and OFAC don't accept those mathematical arguments. They demand all secrets. This is the fundamental difference in approach that perpetuates geopolitical distrust. Unanticipated forecast: As this trial continues, there will be a legal push to force auditing companies to hand over client records. But a system based on ZK proofs will bypass jurisdiction. Chinese and US companies will not want to reveal secrets. There'll be an export control certification using selective disclosure. If an international court system can accept cryptographic proof of sanctions compliance, the long-arm in the Huawei trial becomes obsolete. However, we are decades away from legal systems realizing that. Today, the US uses brute force. It insists on seeing the data logs. It will use the litigation uncertainty as a shield to censor and control. In fifteen years, we might look at this specific trial as the event that broke the monopolization of law. The adversarial legal system is too slow to govern real-time hardware. If the court finds Huawei guilty, Huawei will become a legitimate "Layer-2". They will pay a fine, and continue to sell to Iran, while additionally creating more domestic alternatives. The US case would have been a waste of gas. If the court refuses to find Huawei guilty, the case will cripple US deterrence for future attempts. The US will take it as a blow, but it has no alternative. Both branches are irreversible. The ultimate takeaway is not about Huawei or Iran. It is about the finality of law versus the finality of cryptographic proof. Code doesn't lie; audits do. The US will pass sanctions; the corporations will generate legal documents. But nobody can change the economics. In the world we live in, trust is indeed a bug. It should be placed inside secure enclaves, distributed across adversarial jurisdictions, and minimized in favor of verified computation. Only then will we be secure from whatever coercive state prosecutor may come next. The Blockchain news story this week is just about a Chinese tech company under US legal pressure. But if you audit with ethics, it's about every decentralized protocol that ignores the reality of conflicting jurisdictions. Failure to implement an international, legal interoperability layer will lead other countries to recursively call, drain, and revert you. The world that runs on law is being challenged by the world that runs on code. For now, the code runs at 51% capacity while the law runs on appeals. But decades of mathematics will always outlast years of litigation. We are at the foundation phase of that transition. We must prepare to accept a multi-fork world. In that world, the US and China cannot enforce control over each other. The only option left is a settlement layer that is truly universal, not anchored or sovereign controlled. That remains theoretically optimal. Implementation is pending finality. The critical question remains: When the trial ends, will the US truly change the Hong Kong company's business? Or will the US simply discover that the real smart contracts traded against them? The DAO was a warning we ignored. Let's not ignore this one. Build neutral rails quickly, because the long arm of the law is coming to your protocol whether you acknowledge its jurisdiction or not. In times of trust deficit, look beyond the code. Zero knowledge is the only valid currency. Maximum proof is the reward.